摘要
本文从最终控制人的角度,根据2001—2004年的中国A股市场数据,研究了外部审计选择与中国上市公司内部代理成本的关系。结果表明,控股股东的股权结构产生的代理成本越严重,上市公司越有可能选择审计质量较高的“四大”,这种关系受到地区市场化水平、“四大”所在位置以及再融资需求的影响,即在市场化水平较高的地区、“四大”所在的地区以及上市公司有再融资需求时,上市公司的代理成本和选择“四大”的关系得到进一步加强。同时,通过二阶段回归,我们发现选择“四大”能提高公司绩效以及降低控股股东对上市公司的资金占用。
Based on a dataset of listed companies in China＇s A-share stock market over the period of 2001-2004, this paper analyzes the relationship between auditor＇s choice and internal agency costs of China＇s listed corporations viewed from the ultimate controlling shareholders. We find that the higher agency costs created by controlling shareholders, the higher likelihood for companies to choose ＂big four＂ auditors well known for quality auditing reports, and this positive association is affected by regional market development, auditor＇s location, and demand for refinancing. More specifically, the association between agency costs and auditor＇s choice is stronger for regions with higher level of market development and the presence of the ＂big four＂, and for those companies with demand for refinancing. By the twostage regression analysis, we find that the choice of ＂big four＂ helps improve corporate performance and reduce funds appropriation by controlling shareholders.
出处
《中国会计评论》
2006年第2期321-344,共24页
China Accounting Review
关键词
外部审计
控制权
现金流权
资金占用
Outside Auditing, Control Rights, Cash Flow Rights, Funds Appropriation
