摘要
清朝和民国前期的淮北盐商为了达到最大程度的自利目标,不断地利用其巨大的经济优势,或对政府权力进行直接渗透,或收买其利益代言人,以影响国家的大政方针,坐享政策偏差带来的巨大益处。清末市场化和股份制浪潮兴起后,由于政治权力依旧没有受到有效的约束,商人的寻租活动比以前更加普遍,使得盐业利益仍被少数集团所掠取,造成了社会资源的极大浪费,使本已不公的盐业政策愈加败坏。依靠寻租活动而先行致富的商人集团,天然地不能作为淮北社会的普遍代表,不能成为淮北经济发展的带头人。
In Qing Dynasty and early Republican period, the salt merchant took the advantage of overwhelming economic power to bribe the government authorities, or buy off its agents to manipulate the statecrafts. Because the political power was not restricted by a certain procedures, the rent-seeking activities of merchant were much more rampant after the movements of marketization and stock company started. The benefits of salt were still deprived by a handful of groups, so the social resources were wasted to a great extent and the unreasonable salt policy turned much more corruptive. Nor did the salt merchant group naturedly act as the leader for the economy development in Haibei, neither did it serve as the representative for broad classes.
出处
《清华大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第1期62-72,共11页
Journal of Tsinghua University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金
国家哲学社会科学基金项目(05BZS039)
江苏省哲学社会科学基金项目(04LSB005)
关键词
政治权力
商人集团
寻租
political power
merchant group
rent-seeking activities
