摘要
介绍了国外关于信用评级的最新理论研究,包括博姆的外部信用评级垄断模型,穆赫咱德亚的双头竞争模型,布勒克尔的内部评级竞争模型,柯尔斯坦比较外部评级和内部评级绩效的模型。表明信用评级是一种解决非对称信息问题的手段,这种手段平行于激励理论。在好的评级技术下,好企业寻求评级,劣企业不寻求评级,从而避免了逆向选择。
This paper introduces the recent theoretical analysis on credit rating, which includes the theory of monopolistic and duopolistic external credit rating agency （ies）, the theory of perfect competition between internal credit ratings and the model on the performance comparison between internal credit rating and external one. It is shown that credit rating is a way to solve the problem of asymmetric information, different from incentive theory. Under credit rating, all the ＂good＂ firms demand rating service and no ＂bad＂ firm does. As a result, adverse selection is avoided.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第1期194-197,共4页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
关键词
信用评级
逆向选择
垄断
双头
Credit Rating, Adverse Selection, Monoploy, Duopoly
