摘要
刘璇张朋柱张敏针对医保制度实施以来的实际运作情况,从博弈角度分析了医保基金缴纳和使用异常行为出现的原因;并从改变博弈均衡解的角度提出了有效引导企业、医患、医院走出异常的一系列措施建立针对企业、医患、医院的黑名单制度,通过信息共享降低监督成本,将服务质量纳入与医院的结算办法等。
Based on the suspicious behavior during the payment and usage of the medical insurance in reality, to establish three game theoretic models involving medical insurance management center and cooperation, patient, hospital, separately. In these models,we quantify the fine which is rational considering the suspicious behavior, then propose some precious measurement to avoid the occurrence of suspicious behavior.
出处
《医学与哲学（A）》
北大核心
2007年第2期9-11,共3页
Medicine & Philosophy:Humanistic & Social Medicine Edition
基金
国家重点自然科学基金
项目编号:70533030
关键词
医保制度
异常
博弈
策略改进
medical insurance, suspicious, game theory, strategy development
