摘要
苏州市采取委托代理的形式为流动人口提供定点限价分娩服务,然而政策实施以来并没有达到政府预期的效果。运用经济学中的委托代理理论探讨公立医院执行公共政策过程中机会主义行为出现的原因,通过建立完善的监督机制、实行有效的激励政策及提高公共政策的质量,可以为我们找到解决政府与公立医院在政策执行过程中出现的委托代理失灵问题的有效途径。
The city of Suzhou supply the maternal health services for floating population in the form of Principal-agent, however, since the implementation of the policy has not achieved the desired results, Discuss the opportunism of public hospitals in the process of implementation of government policies by Principal-agent theory in economics, we can find effective ways to solve failures of the principal-agent in the process of implementing the policy through creating a sound monitoring mechanism, implementing an effective incentive system and raising the quality of public policies.
出处
《中国初级卫生保健》
2007年第3期36-38,共3页
Chinese Primary Health Care
基金
苏州大学大学生科研基金项目(KY200506A)。
关键词
政府
公立医院
委托代理
government, public hospitals, principal-agent
