摘要
本文通过构建简单的理论模型研究了金字塔所有权结构对上市公司自愿性信息披露的影响,并以2002—2004年我国家族控股上市公司为样本进行了实证检验。研究发现终极控制人为了获取私人利益而倾向于抑制对外披露私人信息,即终极控制人的控制权和现金流权分离度越大、终极控制权比例越高,上市公司自愿性信息披露程度越低,而董事会在一定程度上起到了监督终极控制人行为的积极作用。
This paper studies the impact of pyramidal ownership structure on voluntary disclosure with the simple theoretical model and empirically examines the theoretical analysis results based on the sample of family controlled corporations from 2002 to 2004.The paper finds that the ultimate controlling shareholders will like to disclose less private information,that is the more divergence of the ultimate voting rights and cash flow rights and the larger ultimate voting rights,the lower level of voluntary disclosure will be.The board of directors has some active monitoring to the ultimate controlling shareholders.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第1期44-50,共7页
Accounting Research
基金
中国会计学会计重点科研课题(2003KJA024)
北京交通大学"十一五"重大科研基金
教育部人文社科基金资助项目的阶段性成果