摘要
新制度经济学为深入研究公司治理问题奠定了大量的理论基础,包括契约理论、交易费用理论、企业与经济组织理论和现代产权理论等。新制度经济学家们就如何在信息不对称的角度出发尽量减少代理问题和代理成本做了深入的研究。本文将新制度经济学在委托代理理论方面的相关观点分门别类的与现代公司治理中代理问题的研究方法做出比较,认为造成代理问题的根本原因在于信息的不对称,而解决委托代理问题的主要途径是:约束和激励。
The New Institutional Economics has laid the firm theoretical basis for the Corporate Governance, including theory of contractual trade, costs theory, theory of corporation and economic organization and modern theory of property rights and so on. The experts of New Institutional Economics have deeply studied on how to decrease the agency problem and agency cost in the case of unsymmetrical information. This paper, through a comparative study of some points of New Institutional Economics concerning the consignment and agency theory and the investigation methods for agency problems in modern corporate governance, concludes that the basic reason of agency problem lies in the unsymmetrical information and encouragement and restriction must be put in the first place to solve consignment and agency problems.
出处
《成都大学学报（社会科学版）》
2007年第2期26-28,共3页
Journal of Chengdu University (Social Sciences)
关键词
委托代理
代理成本
公司治理
consignment and agency
agency costs
corporate governance
