摘要
股东和经营管理者之间存在委托代理关系,这种委托代理关系在不同情况下具有不同的表现形式:在信息对称条件下,表现为命令和服从关系,此时无需对经营管理者进行激励,股东以“强制合同”的形式支付给经营管理者确定的报酬即可;在信息非对称条件下,委托代理关系表现为合伙关系,对经营管理者的激励相当重要,因为经营管理者会根据激励强度来付出劳动。
There exists the principal - agent relationship between stockholders and managers, which takes on different patterns under different conditions ： under the condition of symmetric information, it displays as order - subordinate relation ship, which need not incite managers while stockholders can pay managers regular fee by contract; under the condition of dissymmetric information, it displays as a fellowship, which need incite managers because managers may perform according to the payment.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2007年第4期7-10,共4页
Commercial Research
基金
国家自然科学基
项目编号:70572108
社会科学基金
项目编号:06BJY059
中南大学博士后基金的资助。
关键词
激励
委托代理关系
对称信息
非对称信息
incentive
principal- agent relationship
symmetric information
dissymmetric information
