国际环境合作中的集体行动逻辑被引量：27

The Logic of Collective Action in International Environmental Cooperation

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摘要集体行动困境的破解可以从选择性激励、集体结构/制度建设和大国贡献等三种路径切入。制定集体行动规则的权力是大国竞争的重点,而集体行动的合法性也主要源自大国协调。选择性激励通过奖惩和超理性动机等措施实现集体成本与收益的平衡,如果不能实现平衡,则需要进行存量改革或制度设计,以实现集体结构优化。以上三种因素的多维互动决定了臭氧层和气候变化集体行动的成败,其中大国贡献发挥了最重要的作用。首先,成员成本-收益预期和集体规模等因素影响到选择性激励在两种环保案例中的表现。其次,《京都议定书》灵活性和成本分摊方面的缺陷制约了气候变化集体行动。最后,当霸权国(美国)退出某类全球集体行动的时候,其他主要力量(如欧盟)将填补权力真空,并推动集体行动的发展。 Using Mancur Olson's theory of collective action,this essay endeavors to explain environmental cooperation by three variables:selective inducements,optimal group structure or institution building,and major power interactions.Major power interactions decide the rules and legitimacy of collective action.Selective inducements shape the pay-off structure of collective action.Institution building helps to structure stability in collective action.The major powers play a significant role in these three variables.First,selective inducements depend on the preference structure and group scale;second,the flexibility and pay-off structure of the Kyoto Protocol have an impact on the effectiveness of collective action on climate change;third,when the established powers abandon global,collective action in some areas,some rising powers will take over their role and promote collective action.

作者于宏源

机构地区上海国际问题研究所国际组织与国际法研究室

出处《世界经济与政治》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第5期43-50,共8页 World Economics and Politics

关键词国际环境气候变化臭氧层集体行动困境

分类号 D80 [政治法律—外交学]

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1Russell Hardin, Collective Action, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, p. 17.
2Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1965 ,pp. 13 - 15.
3George W. Rathjens, " Energy and Climate Change," in Jessica Tuchman Mathews, ed. , Preserving the Global Environment, New York : W.W. Norton, 1991, p. 173.
4Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York:Random House, 1979, p. 210.
5Russell Hardin, Collective Action, pp. 9 - 10.
6Oran R. Young, International Cooperation, Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 199.
7Todd Sandier, Global Collective action, Cambridge, England, New York : Cambridge University Press,200d,p.32.
8Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.
9Todd Sandier, Global Collective Action, p. 19.
10Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, p. 15.