摘要
本文基于有限理性与信息不对称框架,建立了一个企业并购的一般性信号博弈模型。模型表明,股权并购交易价格受目标企业资产质量、造假成本、并购企业调查成本、并购市场调查效率及买卖双方机会成本等因素的共同影响。建立高效、公平的市场体系,大幅度提高造假成本或建立完备而高效的信用体系,具有显著而理想的效果;足够大的造假成本或市场调查的高效率不仅可以保证市场配置资源的效率而且可以保证最好的交易公平性;但在一个不具有高效而完备信用体系且对造假者缺乏严厉惩处机制的市场里,改进并购市场调查效率或小幅提高造假成本反而可能对市场配置资源的效率形成伤害。
This article developed a pricing model for M＆A based on bounded rationality and asymmetric information. The main conclusions are as follows： the equilibrium price for M＆A is related to the quality, costs for skullduggery, and the investigation efficiency for the goal company; enough costs for skullduggery can not only improve the efficiency for material allocation, but also result in a fairly trading; but in the market where costs for skullduggery are relatively low, improving investigation efficiency or slightly increasing costs for skullduggery will lead to a low trading efficiency.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第6期91-96,共6页
Finance & Economics
基金
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划基金项目(批准号:NCET-04-0883)的研究成果之一
关键词
企业并购
有限理性
非对称信息
M＆A
bounded rationality
asymmetric information
