摘要
分析日本渔业协同组合的建立对日本渔业管理活动的改进,针对这种政府、渔业协同组合和渔民的行为选择结果能够达到相对均衡状态,并且能够有效弥补政府单一监管模式的不足的管理模式,本文从博弈论角度分析渔民、政府、渔业协同组合的行为选择依据,得出了渔业协会是政府有效监管的必要前提,进而对我国渔业管理提供很好的借鉴意义。
It has been proved that the Japanese fishery association has greatly improved the efficiency of Japanese fishery management. Because it can offset the deficiency of the government-only supervision model, and under the model, the government, the association and fishermen can reach equilibrium. To study the function of the Japanese fishery association further, we set up a three-player game model to analyze the behavior choice of each player-fishermen, government, fishery association. Based on the analysis, we reach the conclusion that the fishery association is essential for effective government supervision, which is of value to our fishery management.
出处
《中国海洋大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第3期372-376,共5页
Periodical of Ocean University of China
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(30271025)资助
关键词
博弈论
日本
渔业管理
game theory
Japanese
fishery management
