摘要
我国当前风险投资融资工具主要是股权融资和债券融资。通过构建了一个信号博弈模型,在信息不对称条件下对风险企业家和风险投资家股权比例进行设计,认为能够保证融资的顺利进行和有效防范道德风险。
The most important invest financing tools of our venture capital are stock financing and bond financing. The acticle builds a signaling game model, the stockratio between venture entrepreneur and venture isvestor is designed under theinformation asymmetry condition. We believe that it will guarantee the success of thefinancing and keep away the moral risk availably.
出处
《科学管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第3期100-103,共4页
Scientific Management Research
关键词
风险投资
股权
信号博弈
venture capital
stock right
signaling game model
