摘要
通过企业、银行、地方政府和中央政府四方目标函数的分析和构建博弈模型的论证,得到的结论是:以GDP等数量指标为导向的政绩考核制度和中央与地方之间存在严重的信息不对称,是近年来中央政府时常陷入“经济增长与宏观调控两难”窘境的主要原因。为此,必须尽快改革政绩考核制度,创建银行信贷监测系统,提高中央对地方经济相关信息的可获得性,有效地导向地方政府行为,在制度上提高金融稳定性和管理的科学性。
By analyzing the four objective functions of firms, banks, local and central government and building game-theory model, this paper finds that the main reason of ＂economic growth and macroeconomic control＂ dilemma is the checking system based on GDP and other index and the asymmetric information between central and local government. Therefore, in order to effectively guide the local government behavior and increase the financial stability and scientifically management, we should reform the checking system, build the supervising system of bank credit, and increase the availability of local economic data.
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第7期33-39,共7页
Economic Theory and Business Management
关键词
政府行为
系统性风险
金融稳定性
government behavior
systematic risk
financial stability
