摘要
区域电力市场中发电厂商之间的竞争是典型的寡头市场竞争,各发电厂商的经济行为具有浓厚的对策色彩。以寡头市场为基础,分别以发电量和上网报价作为发电厂商的决策变量,构建出相应的古诺和伯特兰德模型,对发电厂商之间的博弈行为进行了分析,讨论两种模型下发电厂商采取合作或不合作的策略对自身的影响以及市场的经济效率。根据相关模型讨论的结果,发电厂既有进行合作、限产提价、垄断市场的动机,也会担心别的发电厂破坏协议、获取更高的利润,从而陷入两难境地。同时也给监管部门制定政策和监督指导提供理论依据。
The competition model of power plants in regional power market is a typical oligarchic market competition. The economic behavior of power plants is full of strategy. Based on oligarchic market, taking quantity and price of power as variable, the Cournot and Bertrand models are constructed. The game behavior of the power plants is studied and the commercial efficiency of the power plants and the whole market under different strategies is discussed. According to the discussion, the power plants both have the motivation to cooperate with others and the worry about defection, which lead the plants to dilemma. Meanwhile, supervision departments can get theory reference when monitoting and making policies.
出处
《华北电力大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
北大核心
2007年第4期43-46,68,共5页
Journal of North China Electric Power University：Natural Science Edition
