摘要
1994年分税制改革以后,中央政府与地方政府在土地调控上的博弈色彩越来越浓,中央政府"地根"调控的目标是实现土地资源的均衡有序利用和经济社会的可持续发展。理论上其决策是符合全社会福利最大化原则的。但是,作为具有"经济人"思维的地方政府,也有与中央政府利益不一致的地方。研究发现,由于中央对地方政府在土地调控中的投机行为不可能百分之百查处,加之官员任期存在阶段性,现有的成本收益布局决定了地方政府会在土地调控中采取欺骗行为,造成中央土地调控政策的梗阻。制度创新、GPS等技术手段的运用等改变成本收益布局的措施,将有利于减少地方政府的投机行为,增强中央宏观调控的效果。
Since the reform on the system of dividing taxes began in 1994,the central government and the local governments have been increasingly in a game- like situation . The central government aims to regulate the use of land in an orderly and balanced manner to achieve sustained development, In theory, it is in line with the principle of the maximization of social benefits, The local governments, on the other hand, have some different interests then the central government, thinking as they do as economic persons, It is found that due to the possible overlook of some speculative behavior during the macro control process and the limitation to the terms of office the existing pattern of interests determines that the local governments will be engaged in cheating , thus creating barriers to the macro control policy of the central government, Carrying out the institutional innovation and using GPS techniques can change the pattern of the distribution of cost and revenue and reduce the speculation by the local government and eventually strengthen the macro control of the central government.
出处
《当代财经》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第8期24-29,共6页
Contemporary Finance and Economics
关键词
宏观调控
土地管理
中央政府
地方政府
博弈
macro control
land management
central government
local government
game
