摘要
该文以代理理论为依据探讨了公司多元化经营对管理者报酬的影响。为了避免管理者报酬被低估的问题,文章在管理者货币性报酬的基础上引入在职消费。回归结果表明,尽管公司多元化经营降低了管理者货币性报酬,但却增加了管理者的在职消费及总报酬;与任期较短的管理者相比,任期较长的管理者从多元化经营中获得的报酬更多。这些研究结果支持了代理理论的假设。研究还发现公司业绩与管理者总报酬之间存在正相关性。
Based on the theory of agency costs, this article analyzes the relation between managers' compensation and corporate diversification. It introduces non-pecuniary compensation in the managers' compensation in order to avoid underestimation of the managers' compensation. The empirical evidences show that corporate diversification decreases managers' pecuniary compensation and increases managers' non-pecuniary compensation and total compensation. The long-tenure managers attain more benefits from corporate diversification than the short-tenure managers. Both of the results accept the hypothesis based on agency theory. Besides, it also finds that the good corporate performance can increase the managers' total compensation.
出处
《中山大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第4期95-101,共7页
Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
管理者货币性报酬
在职消费
多元化经营
代理理论
公司业绩
managers' pecuniary compensation
managers' non-pecuniary compensation
corporate diversification
agency cost
