摘要
中央政府与地方政府在宏观调控领域的博弈已经成为一种客观的经济现象,值得决策部门关注。通过中央政府与地方政府的博弈模型以及地方政府之间博弈的攀比效应可以解释博弈的内在形成机理。博弈既有积极效应,也有消极效应。当前博弈失序之矫正的关键在于加快制度创新,强化监管力度;加强预期研究,打造诚信政府。
It has been an objective phenomenon of the games between central authority and local authority in the field of macroeconomic control. Therefore, it deserves careful attention by policy--making body. We could explain the initial game mechanism through game model and the bandwagon effect between them. Nowadays, to rectify the game＇s disorder lies in fostering institutional innovation, strengthening supervisory capability, enhancing expectation study and making good faith government.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第7期5-9,共5页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
关键词
中央政府
地方政府
宏观调控博弈
Central authority Local authority Macroeconomic control games
