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共享型可转换优先股的风险投资退出决策模型 被引量:2

The Exit Decision Model about Venture Capital under Partaking Convertible Preferred Stock
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摘要 可转换优先股兼具优先股和股票的双重特性,使得风险投资家并不总是把其可转换债权完全转化为股权,而是根据企业的业绩决定是否实施转换。本文通过建立模型对共享型可转换优先股条件下的最优退出决策进行了研究。结论认为在一定条件下,利用共享型可转换优先股总可实现风险投资的最优退出,风险投资家参与企业剩余价值分配的比例、声誉、企业家私人利益等决定因素都会对风险企业的退出控制权造成影响。 Convertible preferred equity is both preferred equity and common stock, so venture capitalist cannot make convertible equity convert into common stock completely,so decides whether to convert to depend on it's the company's profit. With the model help, the paper concludes that the optimal exit solution can always be achieved with partaking convertible preferred equity. The determinants of exit solution are the proportion venture capitalist participating in the residue value of the company, the reputation and the private control benefits, those effect on the company's control rights.
出处 《系统工程》 CSCD 北大核心 2007年第6期117-120,共4页 Systems Engineering
关键词 风险投资 退出 共享型可转换优先股 Venture Capital Exit Decision-making Partaking Convertible Preferred Stock
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参考文献12

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共引文献55

同被引文献33

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二级引证文献9

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