摘要
投资者和融资企业之间的不完美且不完全信息动态博弈,其结果为精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,这损害了投资者和融资企业的利益。解决的办法是使博弈转化为完美且完全信息动态博弈。具体措施,一是提高投资者对融资企业类型的甄别能力;二是加大绩差企业伪装成绩优企业的成本。
The result of the imperfect and incomplete information dynamic game between investors and financing enterprises is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which damages the benefits of investors and financing enterprises. The solution is making the game turn into perfect and complete information dynamic game. The concrete measures are to raise the investors＇ ability to discriminate the types of financing enterprises on one hand and to enhance the cost of poor - performance enterprises pretending to be good - performance enterprises.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第5期133-136,共4页
Economic Survey
关键词
投资者
融资企业
博弈
精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡
investors
financing enterprises
game
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
