摘要
民营企业偷、漏税现象日趋严重。在考虑个人风险偏好的基础上,分别建立企业与企业之间,企业与税收征稽机关之间以及税收征稽机关人员与政府执法机关与社会之间的博弈模型。分析指出处于相同地位民营企业在不同偏好下的最优策略选择,税收机关对民营企业经营者不同偏好施以查处概事策略选择,税收机关对政府执法机构与社会查处监督的反应策略。
The problem of the civil enterprises'tax evasion is getting more and more serious.In our paper,in accordance with the risk preference of individuals,3 models are set up within binate relations,i.e.,between the enterprise,between enterprises and the taxation department,and between officials of taxation department as well as legal system of the government and society at large.The following conclusion,are drawn:the optimal policy choices of the private enterprises,which are in the same position yet with different preferences;investigation probability strategy options of the taxation authorities,which inspect the private enterprises of different preferences of the operators,response strategies of taxation authorities in the face of the law enforcement agencies of the authorities and the community's supervision and penalization.
出处
《汕头大学学报（人文社会科学版）》
2007年第6期50-54,共5页
Journal of Shantou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
博弈
偷税
漏税
风险偏好
game theory
tax dodging
tax evasion
individual risk preference
