摘要
在缺乏成熟经理市场的环境中,如何筛选管理层是现有研究有所涉及但没有正面阐述的一个问题,也是转轨国家的国有企业面临的一个重要挑战。在1974年斯宾赛(Spence)的基础上构建一个随机的signaling博弈模型,以一定的绩效指标要求作为股权赋予的前提条件,由此可以证明:面对具有一定挑战性的绩效指标要求,低能力的管理层将选择退出,高能力的管理层则会选择进入,从而实现了两者的分离,进而政府可以以此为基本的指标对管理层进行筛选。基于这个模型提出的"逆序收购"模式,能够甄别出管理层收购的目的是效率提升还是财富转移,从而将意在转移国有企业财富的管理层排除出去,突破中国管理层收购的管制困境。
That the right to run a firm has to be unavoidably separated from the owners in a modern economy is a big problem, and how to resolve it is even more significant for state-owned firms. So, it is a big challenge for government to find right teams of managers for the state-owned firms so as to reach the possible highest efficiency. MBO is often applied as the main incentive and restriction for managers, which is once misused in China. It is not the case that all managers deserve to be transferred some part of share,however, because some of them are not qualified or some other reasons. Based on Spence（1974）, this paper presents a stochastic signaling model, which can help government to identify the ability of different managers and its corresponding conditions.
出处
《学术月刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第1期77-84,共8页
Academic Monthly
