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激励机制理论及模型研究 被引量:12

A Study of Incentive Theory and Its Operational Model
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摘要 本文采用规范研究方法,通过对我国现行激励机制的深入研究,从中抽象出激励机制中客观存在的理论问题,包括企业价值、管理者人力资本定价以及企业价值和管理者人力资本定价相关性等,作为设计激励机制模型的理论基础。在此基础上,从动态的角度、从企业价值与管理者人力资本相关性的角度、从管理者劳动两重性的角度对Ross激励机制模型进行修正,从而得出具有中国特色的激励模型。 Designing the incentive system is an essential part of enterprise management. Stephen Ross has proposed a model of incentive system guided by the agency theory based on strict assumptions. However, this model fails to solve certain theoretical problems existing within the incentive system. In addition, the strictly conditioned assumptions have restricted wide application of this model. The author maintains that it is advisable to adopt carefully designed research methods to explore the current incentive system in China in order to find out the objective theory functioning in the incentive system. These can then be referred to as supporting theories in designing the incentive model, including values of enterprises, assessment of managers as human capital, and correlation of enterprise value and assessment of managers as human capital and so on. On the basis of this, the Stephen Ross model of incentive system can be modified from a dynamic perspective, the correlation between enterprise value and assessment of managers as human capital, and dual nature of the work of managers.
出处 《教学与研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第2期44-49,共6页 Teaching and Research
关键词 激励机制 企业价值 人力资本 激励模型 incentive system values of enterprises human capital incentive model
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