摘要
讨论了由一个供应商和一个销售商组成的简单供应链,在销售商还款不确定的前提下,基于供应商和销售商订货过程是Stackelberg博弈,给出了他们的最优定价和订货策略,并说明了通过合理定价,供应商可以有效地防范信用风险;然后分析了销售商违约对供销双方及供应链的影响,并通过算例进行了说明。
The paper discusses a simple supply chain with one supplier and one retailer and analyzes the impact of retailer＇s default in supplier and retailer as well as the entire SC. If the retailer＇s payment is uncertain, the optimal order quantity and the optimal price are given on the Stackelberg game between the supplier and retailer. The supplier can effectively avoid credit risk by rational pricing .
出处
《物流技术》
2008年第2期89-91,共3页
Logistics Technology
