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基于超模博弈的多零售商价格竞争的均衡分析 被引量:4

Analysis of equilibrium for multi-retailer price competition based on supermodular game theory
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摘要 研究了单个供应商和多个零售商组成的供应链环境下,多零售商间价格竞争的均衡行为。供应商与零售商通过收益共享契约进行交易,需求随机且价格敏感,零售商间进行价格竞争。引入了超模博弈理论,证明了零售商间的价格竞争一定存在纯策略纳什均衡,分析了均衡结果的一些特点,给出了存在唯一均衡价格的条件,并通过比较静态分析,得出了零售商定价随契约参数变化的规律。最后,通过一个算例对相关命题进行了验证。 The equilibrium behavior was studied in the context of a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier and many price-competing retailers. Retailers played a price game under price-dependent stochastic demand and revenuesharing contracts. Based on the theory of supermodular games, existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium was proved, characteristics of the equilibrium were analyzed, and the existing conditions of unique equilibrium were also presented. In addition, by static comparison, the change rule of equilibrium price along with the change of the parameters were summarized. Finally, accuracy of the results was verified by a numerical example.
出处 《计算机集成制造系统》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2008年第2期379-385,共7页 Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372011) 高校博士点专项科研基金资助项目(20030006009)~~
关键词 供应链 价格竞争 超模博弈 均衡分析 收入共享契约 supply chain price competition supermodular game equilibrium analysis revenue-sharing contract
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参考文献10

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