摘要
运用合作博弈和数值模拟方法讨论了中央政府、地方政府、国际投机商和国内房地产商在房地产市场形成单人联盟、双人联盟、三人联盟以及四人联盟情况下的局中人的最大支付。我们发现:从每个局中人联盟的总支付看,无论是支持管制还是反对管制,至少存在三方联盟优于四人联盟,四人联盟优于双人联盟,双人联盟优于单人联盟的情景;在反管制联盟中,中央政府和国际投机商联盟的支付小于地方政府和国内房地产商联盟的支付,因此,地方政府和国内房地产商更容易维持反管制联盟,中央政府和国际投机商更容易破坏反管制联盟。要进一步加强房地产市场的管制,必须提高自身调研和检查监督能力,建立管制联盟,瓦解反管制联盟。
The paper analyzes the maximum payoff of the alliance among the local government, the central government, the native land agents and the international speculators, and discusses the individual alliance, the two-person alliance, the three-person alliance and the four-person alliance respectively by the cooperative game model and simulated calculations. We find that： At least, the payoff for everyone from the three-person alliance is more than one from the four-person alliance which is more than one from the two-person, the two-person than thea individual, whether for or against regulation. The central government＇s payoff and international speculators＇ payoffs are less than those of the local governments and the native land agents in an alliance against regulation. Therefore, the local governments and the native land agents would be more active to maintain the alliance against regulation than the central government and the international speculators. To continuously enforce the regulation of the domestic real estate market, the central government should improve the individual capabilities of investigation and inspection, spread alliance for regulation to smash the alliance against regulation.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第12期34-41,共8页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473071)
"985工程"项目(07200710)
关键词
房地产市场
联盟
合作博弈
政府管制
Real Estate Market
Alliance and Attack
Cooperative Game
Government Regulation
