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试析旅游景区门票定价问题——基于垄断竞争和不完全信息下的经济学分析 被引量:1

Analysis of the Issue of the Price of Admissions of Tourist Attractions——Based on Economic Methods of Monopolistic Competition and Imperfect Information
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摘要 应用垄断竞争以及不完全信息相关经济学理论,分析旅游景区门票价格持续上涨问题的原因,得出了两点结论:一是景区垄断经营管理行为造成的门票价格不合理上升将导致社会福利的损失;二是在不完全信息价格听证制度下,旅游者支付意愿下降,又为景区合理调整带来负面影响.为促进整个旅游景区的可持续发展,迫切需要景区为提高旅游产品价值做出相应效率投入,向旅游者传递品牌信号,激励其保持较高的支付意愿和消费信心. By introducing monopolistic competition and imperfect information economic theories, this paper will discuss the reasons for the inceasing of the price of admissions. In addition, it will state two points : 1 ) Irrational rising of price of admissions of the attractive spots are caused by monopolistic operation and management. This will defeat social welfare. 2) Under hearing system with imperfect information, the decreasing of tourists' willingness to pay will cause some side effects to the incereasing of the prince. Therefore, some efficient efforts are urgently needed to be taken in order to restore the product value of tourist and launch the brand singnal to tourists. These actions can reinstate the consumptive confidence as well as to motiveate tourists' willingness to pay. All these can be sure to promote the steady and substantial development of attractive spots.
作者 宗圆圆
机构地区 闽江学院
出处 《内江师范学院学报》 2008年第2期55-58,共4页 Journal of Neijiang Normal University
关键词 旅游景区 门票价格 垄断竞争 不完全信息 tourist attraction the price of admissions of the tourist sites monopolistic competition imperfect information
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