家族企业管理者角色选择的理论分析——代理理论与管家理论的争论与整合被引量：15

导出

摘要管理者是企业的代理人还是管家这是代理理论和管家理论争论的焦点。本文认为,要确定家族企业管理者在家族企业扮演的角色,必须考虑两方面(家族企业的所有者和管理者)的选择倾向,要经过单向选择和双向博弈两个阶段来决定。在家族企业管理者的角色得到确定以后,代理理论和管家理论的应用边界也就会变得明朗。

作者陈建林

机构地区暨南大学管理学院

出处《外国经济与管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第4期47-51,共5页 Foreign Economics & Management

关键词代理理论管家理论家族企业角色选择

参考文献9

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