中国人民银行独立性:条文分析与规范重构被引量：12

Independence of the People's Bank of China:Analysis and Re-design Provisions

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摘要中央银行独立性主要是指中央银行制定和执行货币政策的自主性,是中央银行法律地位的核心问题。人民银行独立性不断增强是我国中央银行法律制度建立健全的重要趋势特征。2003年修正的《人民银行法》第2、5、11、12、29、30及38条是目前人民银行独立性的主要法律规范。分析人民银行的独立性,除法律条文的文义性辨析外,还应当探求条文的历史与现实,并在人民银行实际独立性的基础上,进行有关制度重新设计。 Independence of the central bank, which mainly refers to autonomy that the central bank decides and implements monetary policy, is the core problem of legal status. Independence of the PBC continuously enhancing is the one of the important features of the trend that is established and improved by the central bank of China. The provisions 2, 5,11,12,29, 30, 38of the PBC law of 2003 are the main legal norms of the independence of the PBC. Analysis of the PBC independence, in addition to the text of sexual discrimination of the legal provisions, should explores the history and reality,and independence of the PBC re-designs on the basis of actual independence.

作者杨松闫海

机构地区辽宁大学法学院

出处《时代法学》 2008年第3期18-26,共9页 Presentday Law Science

基金国家社科基金"银行法律制度改革与完善研究"(04CFX009)的阶段性成果司法部课题"我国加入WTO后经济法律制度研究"(01SFB006) 辽宁省人文社科重点研究基地立项课题"WTO与我国银行法的完善"成果对外经济贸易大学博士后研究课题

关键词中国人民银行独立性人民银行法货币政策中央银行 independence of the People＇s Bank of China the People＇s Bank of China Law monetary policy Central Bank

分类号 D922 [政治法律—法学]

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参考文献6

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