摘要
本文利用Hotelling线性市场模型研究了上市公司信息披露对于市场竞争的影响。研究表明上市公司和竞争企业的定价策略与上市公司披露的信息质量密切相关:当披露高质量信息时,博弈双方的最优决策均为降低价格;当披露的是低质量信息时,博弈双方的最优决策均为提高价格。在市场分额方面,当上市公司披露高质量信息时,其市场份额会下降;而披露低质量信息时,其市场分额上升。披露高质量信息并不利于上市公司的竞争能力。同时,实证也表明在价格竞争条件下,信息披露质量与市场份额存在显著的负相关关系。
This article uses the Hotelling linear-market model to research the influence of the listed company's information disclosure on the competition. The research shows all the participators' pricing strategies are related to the quality of information. When the quality is high, it is the optimum strategy for both of the participators to decrease the price. When the quality is low, the optimum strategy is to increase the price for both of them. Besides, if the information quality is high, the market share of the listed company will decrease; if the information quality is low, the market share of the listed company will increase. The result of an empirical research also supports above conclusion.
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
2008年第6期44-49,共6页
Management Review
