摘要
高管报酬的确定并非单纯的技术设计，而是与财务、公司治理机制密切相关的整体。以2002年-2004年深、沪两市的224家民营上市公司为样本，采用面板数据处理方式，实证检验企业绩效、治理机制与高管报酬的相关性。实证结果表明，中国民营上市公司的企业绩效与高管报酬正相关，内部股东比例与高管报酬正相关，外部董事比例与高管报酬负相关；民营上市公司的内部股东比例越大反而带来更高的高管报酬水平，二者之间存在互补关系，说明中国民营上市公司中存在大股东对高管层的赎买行为；外部董事的治理机制可以有效地解决高管层的内部人控制问题，降低代理成本，表明董事会在民营上市公司治理中发挥着重要的战略参与作用。
Executive compensation depends on not the institutional arrangement, but finance and corporate governance structure. Based on 224 private companies in 2002 - 2004 Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, using panel data processing method, this paper does an empirical research on the relationship among performance, governance mechanisms and executive compensation. The results show that the executive compensation is just related with performance, the internal shareholder proportion is just related with the executive compensation, while the exterior board director proportion is negative related with it. It shows that high level of internal shareholder proportion will bring higher executive compensation. In other words, the ＂redeemability＂ action is discovered in the model, and outside directors solve the insider controlling problem effectively, so the board plays a strategic role in corporate governance.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
2008年第3期16-23,共8页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家哲学社会科学创新基地985工程项目
教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(05JJD630024)
关键词
高管报酬
民营上市公司
企业绩效
治理机制
executive compensation
private listed companies
corporate performance
governance mechanism
