期刊文献+

商业银行董事会治理:特征与绩效——基于美国银行业的实证研究 被引量:31

On the Characteristics of Board of Directors and Bank Performance:Evidences from U.S.Banking Industry
原文传递
导出
摘要 本文以1996—2005年间美国43家商业银行为样本,实证分析了商业银行董事会治理的特征及其对绩效的影响。研究表明:平均而言,商业银行董事会的规模略大于非金融性企业的这一指标,且外部董事的比例较高;董事会规模与银行绩效之间存在非线性的倒U型曲线关系,但外部董事的比例对银行绩效的影响不显著;董事长与总经理两职合一、董事会次级委员会的数量、外部董事拥有的董事席位数均与银行绩效显著负相关;董事会会议频率对当年度银行绩效的影响不显著,但与前一会计年度的绩效之间存在显著的负相关关系;董事持股比例与银行绩效之间存在非线性的关系,而总经理任职年限对银行绩效的影响不显著。 This paper examines the characteristics of board of directors and its effects on commercial bank performance in U. S. during 1996 - 2005. We find that, on average, board size is larger in commercial banks than that in non financial firms, and an inverted U shaped relation between board size and bank performance; the average ratio of outside directors is higher, but its effects on bank performance is insignificant; board leadership structures where the chairman of board and CEO is separated, is positively related to bank performance, but the numbers of board committees and the board seats hold by outside directors are negatively associated with bank performance; the association between the annual number of board meetings and bank performance is insignificant, but the board meeting frequency is inversely related to prior bank performance; a non-linear relation between the fractions of stock owned by board members and bank performance, and the effect of CEO tenures on bank performance is insignificant.
作者 潘敏 李义鹏
出处 《金融研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第7期133-144,共12页 Journal of Financial Research
基金 国家社科基金项目"基于银行业行业特征的商业银行公司治理机制研究"(项目批准号:06BJY107) 教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"项目 武汉大学国家"985"创新研究基地项目子课题的资助
关键词 商业银行 董事会 公司治理 银行绩效 commercial banks board of directors corporate governance bank performance
  • 相关文献

参考文献24

  • 1潘敏.商业银行公司治理:一个基于银行业特征的理论分析[J].金融研究,2006(3):37-47. 被引量:103
  • 2Adams, R. , and H. Mehran, 2003, " Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies", FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 123 - 142.
  • 3Adams, R. , and H. Mehran, 2005, "Corporate Performance, Board Structure and Its Determinants in the Banking Industry", Working Paper, SSRN.
  • 4Andres, P. , and E. Gonzalez, 2006,Corporate Governance in Banking: the Role of Board of Directors, Working Paper, University of Empresa.
  • 5Beasley, M. , 1996," An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud", Accounting Review 71 : 443 -465.
  • 6Beck, T. , A. Demirgtic-Kunt, and R. Levine. , 2005, "Bank supervision and Corruption in Lending", Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming.
  • 7Core, J. , R. Holthausen and D. Larcker. , 1999, "Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance", Journal of Financial Economics 51 : 371 -406.
  • 8Fama, E. F. , and M. Jensen, 1983, "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law and Economics 26:301 - 325.
  • 9Fich, E. , and A. Shivdasani, 2006, "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors", Journal of F~nance 61 : 689 -724.
  • 10Hermalin, B. E. , and M. S. Weisbach, 1991, "The Effects of Board Composition and Director Incentives on Firm Performance", Financial Management 20:101 - 112.

二级参考文献26

  • 1Furfine,C.H.,2001,"Banks as Monitors of Other Banks:Evidence from the Overnight Federal Fund Market."Journal of Business 74,33-57.
  • 2Freixas,X.and J.Rochet,1997,Microeconomics of Banking ,MIT Press.
  • 3Gurley, J. and E. Shaw, 1960, Money in the Theory of Firance , Washington: Brooking Institution.
  • 4Jensen, M., 1993, "The Modem Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Inter Control Systems. "Jourrud of Finance48,831- 880.
  • 5Jensen , M. C. and W.H. Meekling, 1976, "Theory of the Finn: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure."Journal of Financial Economics3,305-360.
  • 6John , K., A. Saunders and L. Senbet, 2000," A theory of Bank regulation and Management Compensation". Review of Financial Stwdies 13,No1: 95- 125.
  • 7John, K.and L.Senbet,1998,"Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness." Journal of Banking and Finance 22, No4,371 -403.
  • 8John ,T.A.and K.John, 1993,"Top Management Compensation and Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Com pensation Contracts . " Journal of Accounting Research 25(supplement):85- 125.
  • 9John ,K.and Y,Qian,2003 " Interactive Feature in CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry," FRBNY Economic Policy Review 9, 109 - 121.
  • 10John,K. ,H. Mehran and Y. Qian,2003,"Regulation,Subordinated Debt and Incentive of CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry. "Unpublished paper, FRBNY.

共引文献102

同被引文献365

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部