摘要
近年来,公众对证券分析师利益冲突的广泛关注促使政府及相关部门采取了组织隔离与业务分立等一系列监管措施以保护投资者利益。然而,近期的实证研究却对"证券分析师利益冲突损害投资者利益"这一监管前提提出了质疑。本文在对1995—2007年间相关文献进行综述的基础上,分析了实证结果与监管当局观点之间存在差异的原因,并据此提出了若干利益冲突监管政策调整思路,以期为我国证券市场监管效率的提高提供启示和借鉴。
Public attention to the conflicts of interest of financial analysts has triggered the enforcement of series regulatory measures, such as organizational isolation and business separation to protect investors' interest. However, recent empirical studies questioned that "investors are harmed by analysts conflicts of interest", the premise which regulation works on. This paper analyzes the difference between the evidence and authorities' viewpoints based on a related literature review from 1995 to 2007, and argues that revision may be needed to constrain conflicts of interest to improve the efficiency of stock market regulation in China.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第7期170-183,共14页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
证券分析师
利益冲突
投资者利益
金融监管
financial analysts, conflicts of interest, investor interests, financial regulation