摘要
股权分置改革完成后,中国上市公司的股权结构实现股份全流通和股权分散化,内部人控制问题得到强化,股东和管理层之间发生严重的委托代理问题。从分析管理者效用函数出发寻求其最优努力的内解,通过股东建立的股权激励机制来约束最优努力解,寻求完全信息动态博弈的子博弈精练纳什均衡解,分析结果显示,企业价值最大化由管理层努力产出弹性和努力成本弹性决定,并受企业的资源配置、赢利能力的约束。
After the share splitting reform, the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies caused all the shares to be tradable and the degree of ownership concentration lessened. The insider control is to be strengthened. The critical principal -agency problems will be generated between shareholders and managers. This paper analyzes the managers＇ utility function to find the equilibrium solution, which is restrained by option incentive system posed by the shareholders. After finding the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solution in the complete information dynamic policy suggestion is put forward by shareholders. The results show that the maximum corporation value is determined by the mangers＇ output elasticity of endeavor and the cost elasticity of endeavor, and subjected to the allocation of resources and profitability.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第8期74-77,共4页
Commercial Research
基金
北京市人文社科重点项目
北京市人才强校计划资助项目
项目编号:SZ200710009003
关键词
股权分置改革
股权激励
子博弈精练纳什均衡
share splitting reform
option incentive
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
