摘要
从公司治理理论的角度,非公允关联交易分为大股东对小股东的"掠夺"类型和管理层对股东的"委托—代理"侵害类型,中国股票市场的特殊背景和特有公司治理结构使两者合二为一,造成了非公允关联交易的泛滥。非公允关联交易的产生和盛行是市场失灵的表现之一,需要政府监管来解决,遗憾的是监管也存在失灵问题。要解决此问题,除了让监管本身更加全面和严谨之外,更要从造成我国关联交易盛行的历史背景原因和特殊公司治理结构入手,才能从根本上解决我国上市公司关联交易问题。
The emerging and vogue of inequitable related party transactions is one of the manifestations of market malfunction. We need government＇ s regulations to solve the problem which the market cannot solve by itself, but the government which could also be out of order isn＇t omnipotence. We also find that there is dynamic gamble between listed finns and government supervision and there is malfunction in government supervision. To solve the problem of inequitable related party transactions we should improve corporate internal govemment and external government simultaneously. We also should trace back to the history of the related party transactions and consider the ultimate reason of related party transactions to improve from the aspect of system.
出处
《黑龙江对外经贸》
2008年第7期138-140,共3页
Heilongjiang Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
关键词
关联交易
公司治理
上市公司
related party transactions
corporate governance
listed companies
