摘要
城市化进程中的农用土地非农化问题,是现阶段中国转轨与经济发展过程中面临的重大问题。由于财政分权和税制改革,市场经济条件下地方政府与中央政府在土地利用上的效用函数发生偏离。同时土地产权不清晰和管理制度上的缺陷,地方政府受现实地方利益最大化的驱动,追求土地出让收入最大化而滥占耕地,导致地方政府目标激励的偏差。本文在建立模型的基础上,分析了地方政府在农地非农化的进程中的激励和相应制度安排。
In China＇ s transition and economic development, abusive rural land requisition in urbanization process is an important policy issue. Because of inaccurate land property rights and imperfect land administration system, the local government is driven by maximizing local benefies, to pursue land offers to maximize income. Which causes the deviation of the local government＇s target encouragement, from the right direction. The local government and central government deviate in the effect function of the land exploitation. Based on building up a model, analysis is made of the encouragement to the local government and institutional arrangement in the progress of farmland con- version.
出处
《西北农林科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2008年第5期10-13,共4页
Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
土地产权制度
地方政府
农地非农化
城市化
land property rights system
local government
farmland conversion
urbanization
