摘要
供应链成员的谈判能力不对称会影响供应商的质量改进投入。在谈判能力不对称情况下,建立一种供应商质量改进的决策模型,研究发现供应商的质量改进投入不能达到供应链最优水平。当供应商拥有较强谈判能力时,购买商对质量改进评价过程中存在的道德风险将降低供应商的质量改进投入;当购买商拥有较强谈判能力时,如果购买商提供给供应商长期的交易契约,质量改进投资风险率越大,供应商质量改进投入越低。经仿真比较,当供应商的初始质量较高时,供应商质量改进投入在购买商拥有较强谈判能力的情况下高于在供应商拥有较强谈判能力的情况。
The asymmetry of negotiation power among the members of the supply chain will affect the investment of the supplier in quality improvement. Under the condition of asymmetry of negotiation power, a decision model of supplier for quality improvement was built in this paper. It is found that the investment of the supplier in quality improvement cannot achieve the optimal supply chain level through quantitative analysis. When the supplier has more negotiation power, the investment of the supplier for quality improvement is decreased with the increasing of moral-risk in the buyer＇s appraisal result of the improvement of product quality. When the buyer has more negotiation power and provides the supplier with long-term transaction contract, the investment of the supplier for quality improvement is decreased with the increasing of risk rate of quality improvement investment. Through simulation, it is shown that when the supplier has higher initial quality, the investment of the supplier for quality improvement is higher in the circumstance where the buyer has more negotiation power than in the opposite situation where the supplier has more negotiation power.
出处
《工业工程与管理》
2008年第5期58-62,共5页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572103)
关键词
供应链
质量改进
谈判能力不对称
supply chain
quality improvement
negotiation power asymmetry
