摘要
委托代理问题在很大程度上制约着委托代理双方合作关系的发展。以往的研究主要在信息不对称的假设下利用参与约束和激励相容约束条件寻找最优解,最新研究结果表明,通过引入信任机制,可以证明信任在委托代理关系中的存在性和对代理问题治理的有效性。
Principal-agent problem plays a much large part in constraining the development of principal-agent relationship. On the hypothesis of asymmetry information, previous researches are concentrated on seeking optimal solution with participation constraint and incentive eompatibihty constraint. The new research shows that by introducing trust mechanism, we can testify the existence of trust in principal-agent relationship and its validity in governing agent problem.
出处
《经济与管理》
2008年第10期31-34,共4页
Economy and Management
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“企业营销利益相关者的委托代理机制研究”(批准号06BJY095)
关键词
委托代理问题
信任机制
重复博弈
principal-agent problem
trust mechanism
repeated game
