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一种面向密码芯片的旁路攻击防御方法 被引量:4

Countermeasure for Cryptographic Chips to Resist Side-Channel Attacks
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摘要 针对不同级别的旁路信息泄露,提出一种通用的旁路信息泄露容忍防御模型,并结合信息熵理论给出该模型的形式化描述.谊模型采用(t,n)门限机制,使得部分旁路信息泄露不会影响系统的安全性.在该防御模型的基础上,结合高级加密标准AES-128算法的安全实现,设计了一种两阶段掩码的旁路攻击防御方法.与已有的防御方法相比,该方法能够同时防御高阶旁路攻击与模板攻击.通过理论分析与仿真实验验证了该方法的有效性. As for different level side-channel leakages, a general side-channel leakage-tolerated model is proposed and a formal description is given by entropy theory. This model adopts (t,n) threshold leakage mechanism, and thus the security do not compromise with partial side-channel leakages. Based on the proposed model, a two-phase masking method is utilized to build leakage-tolerated Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-128). Compared with the conventional countermeasures, this method can resist higher-order side-channel attack and template attack simultaneously. The effectiveness of this method is verified by theoretical analysis and simulation.
作者 张涛 范明钰
出处 《软件学报》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2008年第11期2990-2998,共9页 Journal of Software
基金 Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.60373109 60272091 (国家自然科学基金)
关键词 密码芯片 旁路攻击 泄露容忍模型 高阶旁路攻击 模板攻击 高级加密标准 cryptographic chip side-channel attack leakage-tolerated model higher-order side-channel attack template attack advanced encryption standard
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