摘要
地方政府与上级政府和地方民众之间的关系具有委托——代理性质。以委托——代理模型为基础,通过建立作为代理人的地方政府在处置公共危机过程中的支付矩阵,可以更清楚地分析地方政府作为代理人的各种策略选择,从而有力地解释地方政府在公共危机管理中虚假治理的原因。
The relation between local government and superior government or local people has the feature of principal.agent. Based on principal-agent model, through the local government＇s payoff matrix in dealing with public crisis, the strategy profile of local government serving as an agent can be clearly analyzed, and then the reason of the local government＇s falsification can be strongly explained.
出处
《兰州交通大学学报》
CAS
2008年第5期8-11,共4页
Journal of Lanzhou Jiaotong University
