摘要
本文研究了中国上市公司长期高额现金持有行为的动机。研究发现,选择高现金持有政策的上市公司经营绩效与同类公司相比并非显著较好,且后期的资本支出较少。本文得出的结论是,高现金持有政策并不符合公司价值最大化原则,现金持有的预防性动机假说不成立,高现金持有的潜在原因是管理层消极工作的代理问题。上市公司应增加对管理层的治理约束,改善管理层激励机制。这对提高资本市场资源配置效率,进一步提升上市公司质量有重要的现实意义。
We study the ex-post operating performance and the investment behaviors of long-term high-cash-holding companies, together with the financial and corporate governance features, in order to disclose the motives of high-cash-holding policies. The result is not favorable for the precautious motive hypothesis. The potential motive of high-cash-holding policies is shirking and managerial entrenchment. Listed companies should improve the management incentive scheme, which is important to enhance the capital allocation efficiency.
出处
《南方经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第11期50-60,37,共12页
South China Journal of Economics
关键词
现金持有
经营绩效
代理问题
Cash-holding
Operating Performance
Agency Problem
