摘要
建立在重复博弈模型上的逆向选择问题称为信誉理论,该理论主要研究博弈参与者如何通过树立信誉实现在非合作博弈中的合作均衡。传统的信誉理论涉及的多是个体的信誉问题,但是当个体信息无法传递时,个体信誉便无法发挥作用。此时,公众通常会对拥有相同标识的集体形成一个整体判断,与个体利益相关的是他们拥有的集体信誉。本文考察了集团内部存在不同类型个体时集体信誉维护的问题,本文称为内部逆向选择问题。我们发现,由于个体利益与集体利益的差异,导致集体信誉的激励作用要弱于传统的个体信誉的作用。此外,由于集体利益与社会利益的不一致,最终即使可以有效激励集团成员最大限度地维护集体利益,如果公众信念更新相对麻木,仍会造成经济运行无效率。
Reputation theory is based on a repeated game by introducing adverse selection. Traditionally, it shows how the players achieve cooperative equilibrium in a non-cooperative game by building up individual reputations. However, when individual information cannot be transmitted, the public will form a judgment on the whole group formed by several individuals with the same title. Therefore, the traditional individual reputation does not work any more. Instead, collective reputation will affect the individuals＇ benefits. This paper investigates the problem of collective reputation within a group which is made up of different types of individuals. We name such a case as inside adverse selection. By building up a theoretical model, we find that the difference between individual and collective interests might lead the effect of collective reputation weaker than that of traditional individual one. Moreover, although the group can find a way to encourage its members, the inconsistency between collective and social benefits will induce the overall inefficiency if the public don＇ t update their beliefs sensitively.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第12期124-133,144,共11页
Economic Research Journal
基金
中央财经大学国家级重点学科国民经济学基金资助
关键词
集体信誉
内部逆向选择
信念更新
Collective Reputation
Inside Adverse Selection
Belief Updating
