摘要
将地方政府干预经济行为融入Krugman的"中心——外围"模型,以此来分析地方政府采取保护政策对厂商迁移和地区产业集聚的影响。研究表明,在中国分权体制改革进程中,地方政府基于对税基、管辖区福利、政府自身利益等因素的考虑,采取了有利于本地区经济利益的保护政策,在一定程度上扭曲了地区间生产资源的配置。在实施地方保护政策情况下,除非运输成本很低、迁移目的地的支出水平很高或市场分额足够大,从而为厂商带来的规模经济效应足以补偿地方保护所产生的厂商迁移的机会成本,否则,将阻碍厂商的跨辖区迁移和产业的地区集聚,从而造成地区间分工弱化与市场分割、各地区重复建设与产业同构现象的存在。
Through integrating the local government＇s intervening economic behavior into Krugman＇s Core-periphery Model, this paper attempts to analyze the impact of the local government＇s protectionism on the migration of enterprises and regional industrial agglomeration. Our research shows that during the process of China＇s decentralization reform, local governments tend to take a protective policy conducive to the local economic profits, notably the tax base, the regional welfare and their own interests, which to some extent distorts the allocation of resources among different regions. Unless the transport cost is extraordinarily low and the expenditure or market share of the destination for the relocation is so large that the scale effect for enterprises can counteract the opportunity cost of relocation caused by local protection, local protectionism will hinder the inter-regional relocation of enterprises and industrial agglomeration, leading to a weakened labor division between different regions, market segmentations, regional redundant constructions and industrial isomorphism.
出处
《南京师大学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第1期53-58,共6页
Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家社科基金重大项目(07&ZD017)
教育部人文社科研究项目(08JA790039)
关键词
地方保护
产业集聚
空间经济模型
local protection
industrial agglomeration
spatial economic model
