摘要
本文运用中国省级水平1989年至2004年的面板数据,系统考察了地区政府规模、民营化、经济开放程度、教育水平等社会经济因素对官员腐败的影响。通过运用固定效应模型和工具变量方法,我们发现,政府规模的扩大会增加地区腐败案件的发生率,而核心政府部门规模的影响更为明显,党政部门规模上升1%至少会带动腐败犯罪案件提高0.68%—1%。FDI比例的提高会增加地区的官员腐败水平,而进出口比例的提高却有助于降低地区的腐败水平。民营化程度的影响则不确定。我们还发现政府支出规模和结构也对一个地区的官员腐败产生显著影响。
Using a panel data at the provincial level during the period 1989--2004, this paper examines the effects of government size, privatization, openness, and education on regional corruption. Applying a fixed-effect model and IV estimation, we find that government size positively affects the incidence of corruption, and the effect becomes larger for the increase in the size of the ＂core＂ government sector. A one percent increase in the core government sector leads to a 0.68--1% increase in bureaucrat corruption. While FDI penetration is positively associated with corruption, the ratio of imports and exports to GDP is negatively associated with corruption. The impact of privatization on corruption is ambiguous. We also identify the significant impacts of the size and structure of government expenditures on corruption.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第1期57-69,共13页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目的资助(项目批准号70573008)
关键词
腐败
市场化
政府规模
Corruption
Market Development
Government Size
