摘要
"博弈参与人是理性的",这是博弈论的公设,然而理性人假设却导致诸多博弈困境。"有限理性"的博弈主体往往不能或不会采取完全理性条件下的最优策略。博弈主体间的策略均衡往往是通过学习调整的结果,而不是一次性选择的结果,而且即使达到了均衡也可能再次偏离。分析有限理性博弈主体的博弈问题必须发展不同于完全理性博弈分析的专门分析框架。进化博弈理论从参与人群体出发,以群体为研究对象,采用从群体到个体的局部动态法来分析博弈参与人的决策行为,由此得到的结论能够更加准确地描述现实人的行为。
That 'players are rational' is a public pre-assumption in game theory.But the rational agent hypothesis may bring about quite a lot of dilemmas.The agent with 'bounded rationality' usually may not or would not take the optimal strategy under complete rationality condition.The strategy equilibrium between agents is often the results of learning and adjusting,rather than the result of a one-time choice.They may also deviate again even when they reached a balance.Analysis of the game problems of bounded rationality must be developed into a specialized analytical framework that is different from game analysis of complete rationality.Evolutionary game theory starts from the participating groups,uses groups as research object,and adopts local dynamic method from groups to individual to analyze player's decision-making.The resultant conclusion can be more accurate to describe the behavior in reality.
出处
《华南师范大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第1期49-52,68,共5页
Journal of South China Normal University：Social Science Edition
基金
国家社科基金项目"经济逻辑研究"(批准号:06BZX050)
天津市"十五"社科研究规划课题(批准号:TJ05-ZX004)
关键词
博弈论
理性人
均衡
有限理性
进化博弈论
game theory
rational agent
equilibrium
bounded rationality
evolutionary game theory
