摘要
农业产业化要快速发展,必须走好农产品品牌化之路,但我国农产品的品牌建设仍然落后。利用信息经济学信号传递经典模型,进行了加工农产品品牌信号传递效应分析。基于信誉建设的加工农产品品牌信号可以显示产品的质量。信息不对称条件下,低质量企业选择的品牌建设投入水平和它在信息对称时选择的水平是一样的;而高质量企业要选择大于信息对称时的品牌建设投入水平,超出部分是高质量企业把自己和低质量企业区别开来的信息成本。
The rapid development of agriculture industrialization depends on the branding of agricultural products. But the brand building of agricultural products in China is still laggard. By using classical signaling model in information economics, the brand signaling effects of agricultural products were analyzed. The brand signal of agricultural products based on credit building could indicate the quality of products. Under the conditions of asymmetric information, low-quality enterprises would choose the same level of brand building investment as the level under the conditions of symmetric information. High-quality enterprises would choose higher level of brand building investment. The excessive part would be the information cost to distinguish high-quality enterprises from low-quality enterprises.
出处
《安徽农业科学》
CAS
北大核心
2009年第5期2270-2271,2277,共3页
Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences
基金
中国农业大学本科生科研训练计划(URP-2008)
关键词
农产品
品牌
信号传递
Agricultural products
Brand
Signaling
