摘要
运用委托代理理论研究政府部门与公交企业之间的行为策略,构建了信息不对称下政府激励公交企业增进服务水平的委托代理模型,为政府激励公交企业提高服务水平的决策提供了理论依据.
We analyzed the principal-agent relation between the public transportation enterprises and government,and constructed the principal-agent model in which the government stimulates the public transportation enterprises to improve their service in the condition of the asymmetrical information, which is the theory basis of the government decision-making
出处
《南昌工程学院学报》
CAS
2009年第1期50-53,共4页
Journal of Nanchang Institute of Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70432001)
关键词
公交企业
委托代理
服务水平
public transportation enterprise
principal-agent
incentive
