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金融业潜规则与激励相容监管体制的构建 被引量:2

Financial Sub-regulations and Incentive-compatible Regulation
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摘要 潜规则在我国金融业广泛存在着。马后炮式监管是潜规则形成的一个重要因素。潜规则造成了不少后果,如政府注资低效性、金融业违规屡禁不止、不良贷款率居高不下。改变马后炮监管,就要建立激励相容监管模式,以激励相容为核心,包括激励、约束、相容三个环节。 Sub-regulations are presence abroad in regulation. Horse after cannon's regulation is an important factor in forming Sub-regulations. Lots of evil consequences are coming into being: low compatible-incentive of investment from government,repeatedly getting out of line,substantive badness loan. So incentive compatible regulation should be set up. The definition includes incentive, budget and consistent.
作者 李红坤
出处 《海南金融》 2009年第4期50-54,共5页 Hainan Finance
基金 山东省软科学项目[2008RKB282]
关键词 潜规则 马后炮 激励相容监管 Sub-regulations Horse after cannon Incentive compatible Regulation
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