摘要
文章从政府控制的制度层面因素出发,以大股东资金侵占为研究载体,考察中国机构投资者的股东积极主义行为。研究表明,总体而言,机构投资者已具备股东积极主义的动机和能力,能抑制大股东资金侵占行为,从而客观上保护投资者权益;然而,相对于非政府控制的上市公司来说,在政府控制的上市公司中,机构投资者采取股东积极主义行为受到更多的限制,其抑制大股东资金侵占行为,客观上保护投资者权益的效果较差;并且主要是体现在地方政府控制的上市公司中。这意味着制度层面的政府控制因素对公司层面的机构投资者的股东积极主义行为具有重要影响。
Based on the institutional-level factors of governmental control, the paper discusses the shareholder activism behaviors of institutional investors through analyzing the case of controlling shareholders＇ embezzlement. The results show that, generally, institutional investors can restrain shareholders＇ embezzlement behaviors and protect shareholders＇ rights. However, compared with listed companies which are non-governmentally controlled, the shareholder activism behaviors of institutional investors are limited more. Its effects on restraining embezzlement behaviors and protecting shareholders＇ rights are worse and this situation is caused by local governmental control on listed companies. It means that the institutional-level factors of governmental control have significant impacts on the shareholder activism behaviors of institutional investors.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期119-130,共12页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672031)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872052)
南开大学"985"工程资助项目(1050821210)
关键词
政府控制
机构投资者持股
投资者权益保护
governmental control
stock holding of institutional investors
protection of investors＇ rights
