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考虑分区备用的主能量—备用联合市场均衡模型 被引量:7

Equilibrium Model for Integrated Energy-reserve Electricity Market with Regional Reserve Constraints
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摘要 为了保证系统在事故情况下电能可以顺利传送到备用需求区域,备用资源需要均匀合理地分布于电网中。文中建立了一种考虑分区备用的主能量—备用联合市场均衡模型。该模型同时计及网络约束、系统备用约束和分区备用约束,其中区域备用需求可以由本地发电资源和相应区域联络线的剩余传输容量共同提供。此外,还分析了主能量价格、备用价格及两者之间的耦合关系。仿真结果表明,分区备用会导致备用稀缺区域内主能量和备用价格的提高,而系统总负荷收益却会相应减少;此外,在寡头市场环境下,与大部分发电商通过持留容量方式来获取更高收益不同,处于备用稀缺区域内的发电商往往需要通过增加其自身出力来获取更大的收益。 To ensure the energy of spinning reserve (SR) can be transmitted to the locational region successfully in the case of contingencies, the SR resources should be evenly distributed in the network. This paper develops an equilibrium model for the integrated energy-reserve electricity market with regional SR constraints, in which various constraints are considered simultaneously, including the transmission constraints, the system-wide SR requirement and the regional SR requirement. The regional SR requirement is met with both the locational generation resources and the unused transmission capacity of the corresponding tie line interface. Moreover, the energy price, reserve price and their coupling relationship are also discussed. As illustrated by numerical tests, the regional SR constraint may lead to increase of the energy price and reserve price within the reserve-shortage region, while the total profit may decrease accordingly. In the oligopolistic environment, the GenCo located in the reserve-shortage area could usually obtain more profit by increasing its energy output, which is different from the common way in which most GenCos could raise their profits by decreasing their energy outputs.
出处 《电力系统自动化》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2009年第11期13-17,共5页 Automation of Electric Power Systems
基金 国家自然科学基金重点项目(90612018 60474048)~~
关键词 主能量-备用联合市场 系统备用价格 区域备用价格 混合线性互补问题 integrated energy-reserve market system reserve price zonal reserve price mixed linear complementary problem
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参考文献11

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二级参考文献18

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