摘要
借助模型从利润角度进一步研究了银行、政府及战略投资者之间在利益上的相互关系。研究发现,三者之间存在着一定的利益矛盾,即银行因价值增值目标而会偏向次要战略股东;政府因"经营能力偏好"而会偏向战略大股东。但是,如果能从法律上进一步明确银行、政府和战略投资者三者的边界,就能实现三者共赢以及最终的利益共存。
In this paper, on the basis of the mathematical model, we made a study of the interest-relationship among the commrecial banks, the government, and the strategic investors from the profit point of view. We learned that there are several conflicts concerning in- terest among the three parties ： the bank could prefer the subordinate strategic investors because of its increase in value,while the govern- ment will value the major strategic investors for the ＂operational capacity＂ perference of the government itself. However, if we can make sure the frontiers that divide the bank, the government, and the strategic investors predictably and legally. Then, all of them could achieve the effect of win-win situation and coexist without the prejudice of their respective interest.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期90-94,共5页
Journal of Audit & Economics
关键词
银行价值
政府利益
战略投资者
边界
bank value
government interest
strategic investor
frontier
